Abstract. The purpose of our editors' introduction is three-fold. First, we provide a primer on sports law analytics for this special issue of the Journal of Sports Analytics. Second, we briefly summarize the papers accepted for inclusion in the special issue following double-blind peer review. Third, we present original research on one of the most vexing sports law analytics questions in the past decade-Is there evidence that the New England Patriots gained a competitive advantage from recording and analyzing opponents' signals in contravention of NFL rules?
Sports law analytics primer
We define sports law analytics as the application of parsimonious statistics to real-world legal issues in the sports industry. But sports law analytics is no panacea. Such work is, more often than not, far from definitive. Nevertheless, sports law analytics can be helpful in forensically finding statistical fingerprints in some sports legal issues. Sports law analytics can also complement more traditional investigatory techniques such as interviews, document review, interrogations, physical evidence collection, subpoenas, and polygraphs. In sum, sports law analytics is an additional tool in any investigator's (complete) toolkit.
In a court of law, sports law analytics exists at the intersection of quantitative methods and formal rules of evidence. Indeed, "analytics are proving to be dispositive in high-stakes sports industry litigation." 1 Getting sports law analytics into the courtroom can sometimes be tricky, however.
of possible trade secret theft involving two Major League Baseball teams. Rick Borghesi penned a short meta-analysis about point shaving in college basketball. With recent point shaving revelations involving the University of San Diego and the University of Toledo, the topic is germane.
Christian Deutscher analyzed recently-released NBA referee play-calling data and found no evidence of any late-game bias by the on-court officials. Deutscher's null results are consistent with the NBA's own internal evaluation of the topic. Jun Woo Kim wrote a short research note about precocity in the NFL, an inquiry that indirectly tested the league's controversial minimum age rule. Former Ohio State University running back Maurice Clarett challenged the NFL's age rule in court over a decade ago and one of the issues before the court was the rationale for the rule. Kim provides evidence that will likely be relevant the next time the NFL's eligibility rule is legally challenged.
Three full-length articles round out the special issue. First, Kevin Hassett, Joseph Sullivan, and Stan Veuger completed a textured analysis of football air pressure issues at the foundation of on-going litigation pertaining to the NFL collective bargaining agreement, New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady, the players union, and league executive Roger Goodell. Second, Michael Schuckers and Steve Argeris wrote about NHL team scouting and return on investment in draft selections. Third, Michael Palmer, M. Quinlan Duhon, and Brian Soebbing analyzed college deviance and its impact on NFL draft selection. We attempt to answer the question here. We emphasize that our indirect detection methods have limitations. 5 Most notably, such methods are not a complete substitute for direct investigatory measures by law enforcement or other personnel charged with the duty to monitor. Like other research methods, sports law analytics inevitably carries a risk of both false positives and false negatives. Forensic-leaning sports law analytics can, however, help shine a light on malfeasance when wrongdoers are trying to avoid detection and conceal their activity. 6 In this way, such analytics can sometimes be used as a starting point for additional analysis and decision-making regarding the allocation of investigatory resources.
If the New England Patriots gained a competitive advantage from the long-running practice of taping their opponents-an act in clear violation of widelyknown NFL rules 7 -we assume that one way the practice would manifest itself would be in the second half of games, after the opponents' signal system was confirmed by one or more code-breakers, and the game leverage was higher. If the spying was helpful, we reason, then the Patriots would win more games than expected due to relatively superior play (-calling) and audible selection in the second half.
To test this hypothesis, we created a halftime "win predictor" with a linear regression that weighed the halftime score and the betting spread of the game. This predictor estimated a team's probability of winning the game at halftime. We compared the Patriots' actual performance versus their model-based expectation for two different eras: The data also suggested that after the Spygate scandal broke in September 2007, this effect was reduced on the road for New England, but remained consistent at home. 12 NFL commissioner Roger Goodell fined Belichick $500,000, fined the Patriots $250,000, and ordered the team to forfeit a first-round draft pick if they made the playoffs (or its 8 The total included 240 regular season games and 29 playoff games. 9 The Patriots' regular season win-loss record was 175-65. The Patriots' playoff win-loss record was 21-8. 10 Our analysis does not include the 2015-16 season. Likewise, our analysis does not include the Patriots' six neutral site games (all Super Bowl games) between 2000-01 and 2014-15. As such, the resulting data set used in our analysis included 263 total Patriots games during the fifteen year time span (137 home games and 126 road games).
Background and discussion
11 According to Bishop, Rosenberg, and Thayer in Sports Illustrated: "During the game one former Packers staffer says, the Patriots seemed to know Green Bay's defensive calls from the outset. The Patriots won 35-0. 'Whatever we called, they got us out of our base call every single play,' the staffer says. 'I've never seen anybody be able to do that before."' 12 U.S. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania highlighted this aspect of the scandal in his June 5, 2008 statement on the floor of the U.S. Senate: "The [c]ommissioner's stated reason for destroying the tapes lacks credibility. He said in his January 31, 2008 letter that 'the tapes and the notes were destroyed by our office in order to ensure that they could not be used for any purpose going forward. Our goal was to ensure that the Patriots would not secure any possible competitive advantage as a result of the misconduct that had been identified.' That objective could have been obtained by storing the tapes in a vault and they would have been preserved for future inspection if they need arose. The NFL would have avoided the inevitable smell of destroying evidence." second and third round draft picks if the team missed the playoffs). 13 Goodell never disclosed the extent of the Patriots' videotaping, but details were revealed in a September 28 18 It could give the Patriots an advantage in the second half. However, from a game theory perspective, the more the Patriots exploited this hypothetical information, the greater the risk of discovery. While New England's general goal is to win as many games as possible every season, the team's specific goal each year, we assume, is to win the Super Bowl. 19 Accordingly, if acting rationally given the risk of detection, the team would seemingly only exploit their taping in the most highly leveraged situations, and less often (or never) when the game outcome was not in question or the game itself was meaningless. In general, the leverage for a game is highest when the score is close, and as the end of the game nears. 20 information on the tapes-mainly, the coaches' signals and the subsequent play-would be simple for someone to analyze during the game. There are enough plays in the first quarter, he said, to glean any team's 'staples,' and a quick view of them could prove immediately helpful. 'I don't see them wasting time if they weren't using it in that game,' said Schlereth." On November 24, 2015, ESPN's Darren Rovell tweeted: "Pats have now won 80 straight home games when leading at halftime, an NFL record. Last game they lost in that situation came on 12/24/2000." 18 In addition to head coach Bill Belichick, some mention has been made of another New England Patriots employee relevant to the discussion here-Ernie Adams. Wright Thompson, a senior writer for ESPN.com and ESPN The Magazine, profiled Adams in February 2008: "On game day, Adams wears a headset in the press box, a direct line to Belichick. Adams advises Belichick on which plays to challenge, and charts trends. 'The one thing the Patriots do better than anyone else is they adjust and make halftime adjustments, ' During the 2000-01 to 2006-07 era, the Patriots outperformed the win predictor model by 7.95% per game, winning 9.78 games above expectation. They outperformed more at home (+6.43 games) versus the road (+3.35 games). During the 2007-08 to 2014-15 era, the Patriots were +7.61 games above expectation at home, but only +0.07 on the road.
How likely is a team to outperform the model at home by 14.04 games, which New England did in its 137 home games during a fifteen year span from 2000-01 to 2014-15? A simplified way to estimate this is to use a binomial distribution using the average projected win rate of all their games. 21 During this period, the Patriots were projected to win 96.96 of the 137 home games. They actually won 111 home games. If one takes a binomial distribution of 137 home games played, and counts the frequency that New England would win 111 games or more, it happens with a frequency of p = 0.00424, or roughly one in 236 observations. This was rarer than any other team or coach measured during the time frame.
Notwithstanding documentation of taping in violation of NFL rules, what if Bill Belichick were simply an exceptional coach? Could these results be explained by brilliant halftime adjustments unaided by impermissible taping of opponents' signals? If such halftime adjustments were the cause, one would expect to see similar outperformances at home and on the road. Dur-ing Belichick's entire career, his home performance was +14.04 wins out of 137 games, or +10.2%. His road performance was +3.42 out of 126 games, or +2.7%. The difference is 7.5%. If innocuous halftime adjustments were the sole cause of the Patriots' superior performance, one would expect his home and road performance to be similar. If one limits the analysis to games after the Spygate scandal broke in September of 2007, the difference is even greater. From 2007-08 to 2014-15, the Patriots were +7.61 wins at home out of 75 games (+10.1%) versus +0.07 wins on the road out of 65 games, or +0.001%. Nearly the entire secondhalf advantage vanished on the road. This suggests that whatever was causing the Patriots to overachieve became more difficult to do on the road after the September 2007 Spygate revelations.
One next asks-Is there something special about the New England home field advantage? Could a larger than average home field advantage explain these results? If New England's home field were more favorable than other teams, one might expect New England to do better at home, both in the first and second half relative to other teams. Similarly, if New England's home field advantage were less, one would expect the Patriots to do worse, both in the first and second half, relative to other teams. The most obvious measure of home field advantage is by points scored versus points allowed. League wide, how much does the average team win by at home? If one adds all the points scored by home teams, subtracts all the points scored by visiting teams, and divides by the total games played, the home field advantage is worth about 2.65 points. We can use a team specific evaluation of home field advantage by looking at the difference of New England's average margin of victory at home, minus their average margin of victory on the road, and dividing by two. This straightforward calculation suggests that New England's home field advantage is only 1.71 points, less than the league average. If home-field advantage were the cause of New England over-performing at home, one would expect the point value to be higher, not lower. The Patriots lower than average home field advantage would make the Patriots' second-half dominance even less likely.
Aftermath and conclusion
According to Bishop, Rosenberg, and Thayer in Sports Illustrated, "[t] ESPN.COM, Feb. 15, 2008. 24 In his Senate floor statement, Sen. Specter highlighted Goodell's comments on this point: "During his February 1, 2008 press conference, [c]commission (sic) Goodell stated, 'I think it probably had a limited effect, if any effect, on the outcome of any game.' Later, during that press conference, Goodell stated again, 'I don't believe it affected the outcome of any games.' Commissioner Goodell's effort to minimize the effect of the videotaping is categorically refuted by the persistent use of the sophisticated scheme which required a great deal of effort and produced remarkable results." that advantage on critical plays-3rd downs in the 4th quarter for example. These critical plays would heavily 'leverage' performance on the field to be converted into wins. In other words, the Patriots would win more games than their on field stats would indicate. This is exactly what we see in the data. Year-in and yearout, Belichick's Patriots have won about 2 more games than expected given their offensive and defensive efficiencies, including turnovers and penalties. No other modern team has even come close to the Patriots in consistently winning more games than their stats indicate. Could those extra wins be due to cheating?" Like Burke, our analysis is consistent with New England gaining an advantage in the second half of games, possibly from recording signals and breaking teams' sideline codes. Alternative explanations for New England's performance were considered, including home field advantage and Belichick's coaching acumen, but such factors seemed unlikely to cause the additional wins. The data also shows that New England may have gained an advantage from code-breaking opponents' signals after Spygate when playing at home. However, given the limitations inherent in any "forensic sports law analytics" approach, we do not deem our research definitive absent a conclusive full-blown investigation by an independent third party.
Indeed, in a February 3, 2008 Advanced Football Analytics blog post, researcher Brian Burke specifically outlined how such an investigation could have been undertaken: "The other point is that if the NFL really wanted to investigate these things, there is ample evidence in the NFL Films archive. There are probably hours upon hours of sideline film from just the Patriots' Super Bowls alone, not to mention playoff games or regular season games. An honest investigation would have taken weeks, not the couple of days the NFL took before destroying the evidence."
Such an investigation would seemingly be consistent with Roger Goodell's statement, as memorialized in a January 31, 2008 letter responding to Sen. Specter, that: "I believe that I have no more significant responsibility than protecting the integrity of the game and promoting public confidence in the NFL . . . "
We agree. And we offer that sports law analytics can be a useful tool to detect nefarious activity and, in turn, protect game integrity and promote public confidence.
